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Environmental quality, public debt and economic development
Abstract
This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmen-
tal quality of environmental policies nanced by public debt. A public sector of
pollution abatement is nanced by a tax and/or public debt. We show that if
the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to
a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low,
the economy is relegated to an environmental-poverty trap. We also explore
the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady
state. In particular, we nd that government should decrease debt and increase
pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality
at the stable long-run steady state.
JEL classication: H23, H63, Q56.
Keywords: Environmental policies, pollution abatement, public debt, economic
development, poverty trap.
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1 Introduction
Environmental protection programs are often constrained by long-term scal
objectives which impose to control public decits and public debt evolution.
These long-term constraints have signicant consequences for developing coun-
tries. The search for nancing mechanisms that do not increase debt burden has
renewed interest in debt-for-nature swaps.1 Therefore, debtor countries reduce
their debt burden, and free up budgetary resources for environmental spending.
In 1991, the Paris Club2 introduced a clause that allowed members to convert
all o¢ cial public debt through debt swaps with social or environmental objec-
tives (Jha and Schatan, 2001; Ruiz, 2007). This led to a marked increase in
debt-for-nature initiatives. Canada, Finland, France, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United States were the rst countries to make use of the Paris Club clause
in the environmental sphere (see Moye, 2003). Finally, debt swaps were part of
the negotiating text for the Copenhagen summit.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the economic consequences of such scal
instrument. More precisely, we study the environmental policy under a debt
stabilization constraint, when public actions to protect the environment are at
least partially nanced by public funds. Could public debt be a solution3 for the
1 In such swaps a non-governmental organisation (NGO) purchases developing country debt
on the secondary market at a discount from the face value of the debt title. The NGO redeems
the acquired title with the debtor country in exchange for a domestic currency instrument
used to nance environmental expenditures (see Hansen, 1989; Jha and Schatan, 2001; Sheikh,
2008). The rst agreement was signed between Conservation International and Bolivia in 1987.
More recently, such a bilateral deal was signed between the United States and Indonesia,
swapping nearly US$ 30 million of Indonesian government debt owed to the United States
over the next eight years against Indonesias commitment to spend this sum on NGO projects
beneting Sumatras tropical forests (see Cassimon et al., 2009).
2Paris Club is a forum for negotiating debt restructurings between indebted developing
countries and o¢ cial bilateral creditors.
3For instance, the Stern Review (2007) estimates that the short-term cost of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions could be limited to 1% of global GDP. This environmental engage-
ment would avoid the economic and social costs of long-term global warming, estimated at (at
least) 5% of global GDP. Could the present generations borrow 1% of global GDP today in
order to nance the ght against the emission of greenhouse gas emissions? If the long-term
cost of borrowing is lower than the cost of global warming, then public debt policy could be
an e¢ cient solution.
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nancing of environmental policies? In other words, is it possible and benecial
for all to substitute a nancial burden to an environmental burden?
We consider an overlapping generations model à la Diamond (1965) with
an environmental intergenerational externality. Indeed, longevity is increasing
in environmental quality. We assume that public environment maintenance ex-
penditure could be nanced by issuing public debt. Moreover, a debt stabilizing
constraint imposes a constant level of debt per capita.
By using this framework, we show that if the initial capital stock is high
enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On
the contrary, when the initial capital stock is too low, the economy is relegated
to an environmental-poverty trap. In opposition to many papers (John and Pec-
chenino, 1994; John et al., 1995; Mariani et al., 2010), we nd that the economy
may be characterized by a conict between environmental quality and capital
accumulation. Increasing debt and/or public spending reduces the capital stock
at the long-run stable steady state, but improves environmental quality. Finally,
we show that when the government decreases debt and increases environmen-
tal protection spending (the debt-for-nature swaps solution), it may improve
capital accumulation and environmental quality at the long-run steady state,
toward which the economy converges if the initial conditions are not too low.
Moreover, such a policy is welfare improving.
Previous papers have analyzed the consequences of environmental policies on
environmental quality, growth and welfare (Howarth and Norgaard, 1992; John
and Pecchenino, 1994; John et al., 1995; Jouvet et al., 2000). Nevertheless, in all
these studies, government cannot fund pollution abatement programs by issuing
public debt. However, debt nancing has already been introduced in dynamic
models with environmental concerns (Bovenberg and Heijdra 1998; Heijdra et
al. 2006), but these contributions focus on a di¤erent issue than ours. Instead of
using debt to nance a share of pollution abatement, debt policy makes possible
4
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Figure 1: Life expectancy and environmental quality (2004).
to redistribute welfare gains from future to existing generations. In our model,
the role of the public debt is twofold: as usual, it redistributes welfare among
existing and future generations, but rst of all, it nances the public pollution
abatement sector.4 Hence, the redistribution properties of the public debt are
limited by the environmental engagement of the government.
Finally, in our paper, we also take into account the impact of environmental
quality on health and life expectancy (see for instance, Figure5 1). This as-
sumption is justied by the results of an increasing number of empirical studies
measuring the health e¤ects of pollution (OECD, 2008). These relationships
are nowadays well-documented and are probably the most striking features of
4This is also the case in a companion paper, Fodha and Seegmuller (2010). However, in this
contribution, there is also private abatement and the results mainly depend on the e¢ ciencies
of private versus public abatement.
5Figures 1, 3 and 4, represent a cross-section of 32 developing countries, which have some
similar macroeconomic characteristics. Namely, we have selected Albania, Algeria, Azerbai-
jan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Salvador, Gabon, Jordan, Lebanon,
Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Ro-
mania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela. En-
vironmental quality is approximated by the Environmental Performance Index EPI. Sources:
World Bank (2010) for economic data and YCELP (2010) for environmental data.
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the negative impact of pollution on individuals. Recently, Kampa and Castanas
(2008) and Neuberg et al. (2007) conrm that exposures to air pollutants are
linked to reduced life expectancy. The relation between longevity and the en-
vironment is studied by Pautrel (2008), Jouvet et al. (2010), Mariani et al.
(2010) and Varvarigos (2010). In these articles, the economy faces a trade-o¤
between nancing education and health programs or environmental protection
programs. But, once again, they do not consider the possibility for governments
to ght environmental degradation by issuing public debt.
In the next section, we present the model. The intertemporal equilibrium
is dened in Section 3. The fourth section looks at the steady-states, while
Section 5 is devoted to dynamics analysis. Finally, Section 6 presents the com-
parative statics. The last section concludes. Technical details are relegated to
the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations model with discrete time, t = 0; 1; :::;+1,
and three types of agents: consumers, rms and a government.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers live for two periods. The size of the generation born at period t is Nt.
Each person will have n > 1 children during his youth. Hence, the generation
born at the next period will have a size Nt+1 = nNt. When old, each one has
a longevity (et) 2 (; 1), with 1 >  > 0, 0 < 0(et) < B and B > 0 nite.
In the following, Et denotes aggregate environmental quality6 at period t and,
following John et al. (1995), we consider that et  Et=Nt corresponds to a
6Et may encompass both environmental conditions (quality of water, air and soils, etc.)
and resources availability (sheries, forestry, etc.). It can be interpreted as an index of the
amenity value of the environment. For instance, the Environmental Performance Index (EPI
- YCELP) could be a good approximation of this synthetic indicator.
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measure of per capita environmental quality in period t. We assume that the
longevity of an old living at period t + 1 positively depends on this index of
environmental quality faced by the household during his youth.
Preferences of an household born at period t are represented by a log-linear
utility function (Wt) dened over consumption when young ct and old dt+1,
which depends on the longevity (et):
Wt  ln(ct) + (et) ln(dt+1=) (1)
where  > 0 is a scaling parameter, arbitrarily close to zero. This parameter
ensures that, for every interior solution, the welfare is increasing in et, given ct
and dt+1.
At the rst period of life, an household born at period t supplies inelastically
one unit of labor, remunerated at the competitive real wage wt, and pays taxes
 t > 0. He shares his net income between saving t, through available assets,
and consumption ct. At the second period of life, saving, remunerated at the
real interest factor rt+1,7 is used to consume the nal good. (et)dt+1 represents
all consumption of an household with longevity (et) during his second period
of life, while dt+1 corresponds to the consumption ow of a sub-period when
old. In other words, a consumer maximizes his utility function (1) under the
two following budget constraints:
t + ct = wt    t (2)
(et)dt+1 = rt+1t (3)
Since the longevity is taken as given by the household, we deduce the fol-
lowing saving function:
t =
(et)
1 + (et)
(wt    t) (4)
We note that saving is an increasing function of longevity.
7We assume complete depreciation of capital after one period of use. Therefore, rt+1 also
denotes the real interest rate.
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2.2 Firms
Since each young consumer supplies inelastically one unit of labor, labor used
in production at period t is Nt. Then, the production is given by yt = f(kt)Nt,
where kt = Kt=Nt denotes the capital-labor ratio. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas
technology, we further have f(kt) = kst , with s 2 (0; 1) the capital share in total
income. From prot maximization, we get:
rt = sk
s 1
t  r(kt) (5)
wt = (1  s)kst  w(kt) (6)
2.3 Environmental quality
In this economy, we consider that production degrades environmental quality,
while public spending, i.e. public environmental abatement, Gt  0 improves
it. Assuming linear relationships, environmental quality follows the motion:
Et+1 = (1 m)Et + Gt   f(kt)Nt (7)
where  > 0 represents the rate of pollution coming from rms activities,
 > 0 the e¢ ciency of public abatement, and m 2 (0; 1); is interpreted as a
rate of natural degradation in the quality of the environment. This exogenous
rate of degradation represents the speed of return of the environment at a level
incompatible with human activities.
2.4 Public sector
The aim of the government is to improve environmental quality, using public
spending Gt to provide pollution abatement and environmental protection pro-
grams. To nance these expenditure, as seen above, the government levies taxes
 t  0, or can use debt Bt. This means that a share of present pollution abate-
ment is nanced by future generations, assuming hence that generations who
will benet from the public environmental protection should pay for it. This
8
assumption corresponds to a beneciary-payer principle, enhancing the willing-
ness to implement the environmental policy. Indeed, one of the results of the
literature is to show that environmental taxation implies such a welfare loss for
present generations that its implementation cannot be wished: one of the gener-
ations that would decide it would also bear the heaviest burden. In our model,
the living generations should more easily accept public pollution abatement if
a share of these activities are nanced through public debt, instead of taxes on
revenues or consumptions.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the government can be written:
Bt = rtBt 1 +Gt  Nt t (8)
with B 1  0 given.
3 Intertemporal equilibrium
We dene the following variables per worker, bt 1  Bt 1=Nt and gt  Gt=Nt.
Equilibrium on the asset market is ensured by:
n(kt+1 + bt) = t (9)
where the individual saving t is given by (4). Moreover, the budget constraint
of the government (8) can be rewritten:
nbt = r(kt)bt 1 + gt    t (10)
and the law of motion of environmental quality becomes:
net+1 = (1 m)et + gt   f(kt) (11)
In order to avoid explosive public expenditure and debt, we assume that
debt per worker bt = b and public expenditure per worker gt = g are constant.
This also means that debt Bt and government spending Gt grow both at the
9
rate n   1. In this case, equation (10) determines the level of the tax faced by
each young consumer:
 t = (r(kt)  n)b+ g (12)
Therefore, an intertemporal equilibrium can be dened as follows:
Denition 1 Given e0 2 R and k0 2 R++, an intertemporal equilibrium is a
sequence (et; kt) 2 R R++, t = 0; 1; :::;+1, such that the following equations
are satised:
et+1 =
1
n
[(1 m)et + g   kst ]  H(et; kt) (13)
kt+1 =
(et)
n(1 + (et))
[(1  s)kst   (sks 1t   n)b  g]  b  G(et; kt) (14)
We notice that the dynamics are driven by a two-dimensional dynamic sys-
tem, with two predetermined variables.
4 Steady states
A steady state is a solution (e; k) 2 R R++ that solves:
e =
g   ks
n  1 +m  (k) (15)
(k)  n(k + b)1 + ((k))
((k))
= (1  s)ks   (sks 1   n)b  g  '(k) (16)
In the limit case without government intervention, i.e. b = g = 0, we have:
(k) = nk
1 + ((k))
((k))
(17)
'(k) = (1  s)ks (18)
with (k) =  ks=(n 1+m). We deduce that there is one steady state (k1; e1)
with k1 = 0 and e1 = 0, and a second one (k2; e2) such that:
n
1  sk
1 s
2 =
((k2))
1 + ((k2))
(19)
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with k2 > 0 and e2 =  ks2=(n 1+m) < 0. We notice that since the left-hand
side of (19) is increasing in k2 and the right-hand side is decreasing, the solution
(k2; e2) is unique. We further have8 :
'0(k1) > 0(k1) (20)
'0(k2) < 0(k2) (21)
Obviously, inequality (20) (inequality (21)) holds in a neighborhood of k1 (k2).
Therefore, di¤erentiating (16), dk=db > 0 (dk=db < 0) for k su¢ ciently close to
k1 (k2). Moreover, we can show that if
Assumption 1 0(e) < n 1+mn(k+b)(e)
2
dk=dg > 0 (dk=dg < 0) for k su¢ ciently close to k1 (k2). Notice that Assumption
1 is satised if the longevity is not too sensitive to the environmental index e.
We deduce that:
Proposition 1 There exists two steady states (k1; e1) and (k2; e2), with positive
capital-labor ratio 0 < k1 < k2 and e1 > e2, if b > 0 and/or, under Assumption
1, g > 0, taking into account that b and g are not too large.
5 Dynamics
As it is summarized in Proposition 1, two steady states with positive production
may coexist. Using a phase diagram, we now qualitatively analyze the dynamics.
This allows us to have a picture about convergence. Does it exist a poverty trap
for a set of initial conditions (k0; e0)? What are the conditions to converge to
the steady state with the largest capital-labor ratio? What is the role of the
policy parameters b and g?
8 Indeed, we have '0(k) = (1   s)sks 1 and 0(k) = n(1 + (e))=(e) +
[0(e)=(e)2]nsks=(n  1 +m).
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Using (13), we immediately see that et+1 > et if and only if et 6 (kt), where
(k) is given by (15). Hence, the locus such that et is stationary describes a
negatively slopped curve in the space (kt; et). Below this curve, et is increasing,
whereas above it, et is decreasing (see also Figure 2).
Using (14), we deduce that kt+1 > kt is equivalent to 	(et) 6 (kt), with
	(et)  1 + (et)
(et)
(22)
(kt)  (1  s)k
s
t   (sks 1t   n)b  g
n(kt + b)
(23)
Since (et) is increasing, 	(et) is decreasing, with 	(et) > 2. However, we
observe that there exists a solution to the equation 	(et) = (kt) if b = g = 0,
meaning that this still holds if b > 0 and g > 0 are not too large. In this case,
	(et) 6 (kt) is equivalent to et > 	 1  (kt)   (kt).
Using (23), we get:
0(k) =
g   nb  h(k)
n(k + b)2
(24)
with
h(k)  (1  s)2ks   bs(3  2s)ks 1   s(1  s)b2ks 2 (25)
Since h0(k) > 0, h(0) =  1 and h(+1) = +1, there exists a unique k
such that 0(k) > 0 (0(k) < 0) for k < k (k > k). This means that (k) is
inverted U-shaped. Since 	(e) is decreasing, we deduce that the locus et =  (kt)
is U-shaped in the space (kt; et). Moreover, above this curve, kt is increasing,
while below it, kt is decreasing (see Fig. 2).
Using all these results, the dynamics are determined as in Figure 2. Obvi-
ously the two points, where the curves (kt) and  (kt) cross, correspond to the
two steady states (k1; e1) and (k2; e2).
This analysis allows to have a global picture of the dynamics. Recalling that
both kt and et are predetermined variables, the steady state (k2; e2) is stable,
12
Figure 2: Phase diagram.
while the other one (k1; e1) is an unstable saddle. This means that starting with
initial conditions, such that the capital-labor ratio is not too low, the economy
converges to the steady state with the higher capital stock. In contrast, the
existence of the saddle with k1 > 0 implies that there is a poverty trap. Indeed,
if the initial capital stock is too small, capital decreases and the economy can
never reach the steady state (k2; e2). In opposition to many papers (e.g. John
and Pecchenino, 1994; John et al., 1995; Mariani et al., 2010), we show that
a conict between environmental quality and capital accumulation may exist.
This is because we do not consider private engagement in pollution abatement,
pollution is hence a pure externality for households. This conict seems quite
realistic as it squares with the increasing part of the Environmental Kuznets
Curves, which corresponds to many developing countries (see Figures9 3 and 4)
or to some global pollutants, like CO2 emissions.
9For details, see Figure 1, page 5.
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As seen in Section 4, increasing b and/or g raises k1, taking into account
that both b and g are not too large. Therefore, this widens the range of initial
conditions (k0; e0) such that the economy is relegated into the poverty trap.
To understand the occurrence of the poverty trap, assume rst that there is
no debt (b = 0), i.e. public expenditure is nanced by taxation ( t = g > 0).
In this case, if the capital stock is too low, the wage is quite small, implying
that the disposable income is not large enough to sustain capital accumulation.
However, this may be mitigated by a larger longevity, which improves savings.
Therefore, a higher initial environmental quality makes the emergence of the
trap harder.
A closely related intuition explains why debt promotes the existence of the
trap. The main e¤ect comes from the fact that in the presence of a positive debt,
a share of saving is devoted to buy unproductive assets (b). Therefore, if the
initial capital stock is again too low, the disposable income of young households
is not large enough to sustain the growth of the capital stock.
6 Comparative statics
We analyze comparative statics to clearly see the e¤ects of government inter-
vention, through b and g, on the levels of capital and environment per worker
at the two steady states. Why is it relevant to study comparative statics at the
two steady states? On one hand, (k2; e2) is stable and an economy converges to
this equilibrium in the long run as long as its initial conditions are not too low.
On the other hand, (k1; e1) marks, in a sense, the boundary of the trap.
The two-dimension system that denes the steady state solutions writes (see
equations (13) and (14)):
(n  1 +m) e = g   ks (26)
n(k + b)
1
(e)
= (1  s)ks   sks 1b  g   nk (27)
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Total di¤erentiation of equations (26) and (27) yields:
A

dk
de

=

0 
 (e)sks 1   n  (e)
 
db
dg

(28)
with
A =

 
 

=
"
sks 1 n  1 +m
n (1 +  (e))  s(e)(1  s)ks 2 [k + b]  0(e)(e) n(k + b)
#
Lemma 1 The determinant of A is positive (negative) when it is evaluated at
the steady state with low capital (k1; e1) (high capital (k2; e2)).
Proof. See the Appendix A.
System (28) writes:
dk
de

=
1
detA



(e)sks 1 + n

 + (e)
  (e)sks 1 + n     (e)
 
db
dg

We further assume:
Assumption 2  is low enough, i.e. satises the following inequality, evaluated
at the two steady states (k1; e1) and (k2; e2):
[n(1 + (e))  s(e)(1  s)ks 2(k + b)] + (e)(n  1 +m) > 0
We note that a low  is also in accordance with Assumption 1. Assumption
2 ensures that  + (e) is strictly positive, while Assumption 1 imposes  +
(e) > 0.
We deduce the total consequences of variations of public debt or of public
abatement, as summarized in the following proposition and in Table 1.
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db dg
Low capital steady state dk1 + +
de1    
High capital steady state dk2    
de2 + +
Table 1: Final e¤ect on equilibrium (k,e)
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an increase in debt per capita b
and/or an increase in public abatement per capita g will increase (decrease)
the capital stock and increase (decrease) the environmental quality at the steady
state with low capital (k1; e1) (high capital (k2; e2)).
In other words, a higher debt and/or public abatement reduces capital but
improves environmental quality at the stable steady state. Opposite e¤ects are
observed for the unstable saddle steady state. This means that the range of
initial conditions (k0; e0), such that the economy is relegated to a trap, becomes
larger.
The mechanisms underlying these results are quite intuitive. Let us focus
on the steady state (k2; e2) as it is the stable one. Any increase of the public
debt (db > 0) will induce a crowding-out e¤ect on capital accumulation, private
saving will support the nancing of the public debt instead of the private invest-
ment. Doing so, the capital stock decreases and production of goods decreases
too. This turns to a fall in pollutant emissions which enhances environmental
quality. On the other hand, any increase of public engagement (dg > 0), ceteris
paribus, will require a higher tax rate, that will also slow down the economic
activity.
Still focusing on the stable steady state (k2; e2), we study whether the gov-
ernment intervention, summarized by the two instruments b and g, can im-
prove both capital accumulation and environmental quality. In order to concili-
ate higher environmental quality with capital accumulation evolution, we show
17
that government should decrease debt and increase environmental protection
programs (as in the debt-for-nature swaps solution).
Using the di¤erentiation of the steady state with respect to b and g, at the
equilibrium (k2; e2) where detA < 0, dk > 0 and de > 0 are equivalent to:
db < G1dg and db > G2dg
with
G1 =    + (e)
 [(e)sks 1 + n]
G2 =    + (e)
 [(e)sks 1 + n]
We may easily see that because detA < 0, we have G2 < G1 < 0. This
allows us to deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satised. At the stable
steady state (k2; e2), both capital and environmental quality increase (dk > 0,
de > 0) if and only if government spending increases (dg > 0) and debt reduces
(db < 0), according to:
G2dg < db < G1dg
The main intuition of this result is the following. A higher public spend-
ing improves environmental quality through public abatement. It also reduces
capital accumulation because of a higher level of taxation. To ensure a higher
level of capital, a lower debt is required to reduce its crowding out e¤ect and
promote capital accumulation.
The welfare analysis shows that householdswelfare evaluated at a steady
state is increasing in the environmental quality only (see the Appendix B). This
provides an adding argument in favor of the policy investigated in Proposition 3.
Regarding the set of 32 developing countries, a closer look to the data, with
help of results of Proposition 3, shows that Uruguay, Brazil, Botswana, Turkey,
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Panama, Malaysia, Gabon, Venezuela, Lebanon and Mexico would benet from
environmental policies based on debt-for-nature swaps mechanism. Conversely,
Ukraine, Philippines, Paraguay, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Syria, Morocco, Macedonia
and El Salvador should probably postpone environmental policies in the short
term, and concentrate on economic growth. Otherwise, these economies may
converge toward a poverty trap.
7 Conclusion
Among several countries, non explosive public debt is a major constraint. Never-
theless, the growing concerns about the environmental degradation (biodiversity
losses, climate change...) lead many governments to ght against pollution and
hence, to increase environmental spending. In many countries, the pollution
mitigation induces the adoption of environmental taxes bearing on households,
alongside with the increase of the individual environmental engagements.
In this paper, public abatement is not only nanced by taxation, but also
by debt emission. We show that, under a stabilizing debt constraint, the en-
vironmental public policy may lead the economy to a poverty-environmental
trap. Indeed, with a higher level of public debt, the stabilization of the latter
reduces householdsshare of income devoted to productive saving. This result
is reinforced by a larger public spending.
This allows us to recommend that policy-makers should carefully evaluate
the level of public debt before increasing their environmental engagement. Fi-
nally, for developing countries that are converging towards a higher capital stock
equilibrium, debt-for-nature swaps could be a win-win solution.
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9 Appendix
Appendix A (Sign of the determinant of matrix A)
Remember that the two steady states (k1; e1) and (k2; e2) are such that:
'0(k1) > 0(k1) (29)
'0(k2) < 0(k2) (30)
where '(k) and (k) are dened in equation (16) and:
0(k) = n
1 + (e)
(e)
+ n(k + b)
0(e)
(e)2
sks 1
n  1 +m (31)
'0(k) = (1  s)sks 2(k + b) (32)
Using the denition of the matrix A, we can compute:
detA =    
= (e)(n  1 +m)[(1  s)sks 2(k + b)  n1 + (e)
(e)
 n(k + b) 
0(e)
(e)2
sks 1
n  1 +m ]
One may easily see that this expression is equivalent to:
detA = (e)(n  1 +m)('0(k)  0(k))
We deduce that detA > 0 when the matrix A is evaluated at the steady
state (k1; e1), while detA < 0 when the matrix A is evaluated at the steady
state (k2; e2).
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Appendix B (Welfare analysis at the steady state)
Any decentralized solution is such that dt+1 = rt+1ct.
The budget constraints can be rewritten:
ct +
(et)dt+1
rt+1
= wt    t
We deduce that ddt+1=dct =  rt+1=(et).
Welfare at the steady state is given by W  lnc+ (e)ln(d=). Total di¤er-
entiation of this welfare gives:
dW =
dc
c
+ (e)
dd
d
+ 0(e)(lnd  ln)de
Using dt+1 = rt+1ct and ddt+1=dct =  rt+1=(et) evaluated at the steady
state, we obtain:
dW = 0(e)(lnd  ln)de
Therefore, since  is arbitrarily small, dW=de > 0. Evaluated at a steady
state, the welfare is only increasing in environmental quality e.
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